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1 INTRODUCTION 
dŚŝƐƌĞƉŽƌƚŝƐĂƐƵƉƉůĞŵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞƉƌŽũĞĐƚƚŝƚůĞĚ “Scenario Planning as a Tool for Long Term 
Strategic Planning - dŚĞ 'ĞŶĞƌŝĐƐ ƌƵŐ /ŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ hŶŝŽŶ ? ?dŚĞ ƌĞƉŽƌƚ ǁŝůů
further evaluate the resultant scenarios and strategies build and recommended as part of 
the titled project mentioned above. Game theory perspectives will be used as a tool to 
analyse how economic agents (stakeholders of the pharmaceutical generic drugs industry) 
will react when what they do affects the actions of others.  
The report will evaluate hypothetical actions taken by generic drugs industry players and 
their outcomes/payoffs relative to the competitions. It will draw on strategic and extensive 
forms of games ƚŽ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇ ŚŽǁ ƚŽ ĂĐƚ ĂŶĚ ŚŽǁ ƚŽ ƚŚŝŶŬ ĂďŽƵƚ ǇŽƵƌ ƌŝǀĂů ?Ɛ ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? tŚĂƚ
would be a more powerful in business strategy than this?  
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 OUTLINE OF LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review is divided into several subsections below. The first part describes the 
game theory origins, concepts and definitions. A considerable body of extant is revealed in 
the following sections, drawing on literatures, assumptions behind the practices and 
theoretical frameworks.  
Later subsections describe game theory topology and processes. Various literatures are 
reviewed on the methodologies used to govern the gaming perspectives. These will describe 
elements, characteristics and models, and critically evaluate the findings. 
 
2.2 ORIGINS OF GAME THEORY 
Game theory was first developed as mathematical model by von Neumann and 
Morgenstern in 1944. The idea behind the theory is that in many areas of human activity, 
people solve problems like when they play games  W they decide what to do based on what 
they think others will do, including decision making that tries to influence others what they 
should do. The concept initially was a military strategy that was used to design optimal 
battlefield strategies and gained popularity during the Cold War.  The theory has been 
ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞĚďǇĞĐŽŶŽŵŝƐƚƐƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞ ? ? ? ? ?ƐǁŚĞƌĞŝƚǁĂƐƵƐĞĚƚŽƐƚƵĚǇƚŚĞƌŝǀĂůƌǇďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
oligopolies (Regan 2007). From here onwards, the theory stepped into strategy and strategic 
management as economists developed more insight into the practical applications from the 
theoretical models  
 
Word Count: 5,180 words 
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2.3 DEFINITIONS OF GAME THEORY 
Game theory is a formal study for decision making where players must make choices that 
potentially affects the interests of the other players. It gives mathematical expressions to 
the strategies of the opposing players and offers techniques for choosing the best possible 
strategy. A formal definition lays out the players, their information, their preferences, the 
strategic action and how these influence the outcome. 
In most popular games, it is relatively easy to define winning and losing, and on this black 
and white basis it is easy to quantify the best strategy for each player. However, it is not just 
a tool merely used by gamblers so that the person can take advantage of the odds; nor a 
method for wining polar games. Game theory can be more generalized while understanding 
how politics is handled (coalitions and power). 
The process of formally modeling situations requires the decisions maker to enumerate 
explicitly the players and their strategic options, consider their preferences and reactions 
(Turocy et. al., 2002). Additionally, the process involved in constructing such a model 
provides the decision maker with a clearer perspective over the macro situation. Thus, game 
theory is a perspective bases application. 
There are always two sides to the game: cooperation and competition. In business, both 
ƉĂƌƚƐŽĨƚŚĞŐĂŵĞŚĂǀĞƚŽďĞƉůĂǇĞĚĂƐŐŽŽĚƚŽƐƵĐĐĞĞĚ ? “ŽŽƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ? ?ĂƚĞƌŵĐŽŝned that 
ŵĞĂŶƐ  “ƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚĞ ĂŶĚĐŽŵƉĞƚĞǁŝƚŚĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ? ? ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐ ƚŚĞ ŐƌĞĂƚĞƐƚ
milestone for Game Theory development, as it leads to cooperative strategy which could be 
thought of as looking at positive sum game or turning zero sum games into positive ones 
using the game theory techniques. (Mintzberg et.al. 2008) 
 
2.4 GAME FORMS: STRATEGIC AND EXTENSIVE 
There are two forms in which games can be represented: the strategic form and the 
extensive form. The strategic form (normal form) is a simplified/reduced form of game 
representation where non-cooperative game theory is studied. A game in strategic form lists 
ƚŚĞ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ƉůĂǇĞƌ ?Ɛ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐƵůƚĂŶƚ ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ ĨƌŽŵ ĞĂĐŚ ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ
combination of choices. The outcome of their choices is represented by a payoff for each 
player; usually a number is annotated to measure how much the player likes the outcome. 
The second form is the extensive form (game tree), which is a richer representation of the 
game.  It shows not only the players, the strategies and their payoffs, but also includes the 
order in which the players take action, the information that players have at the time the 
action is to be taken, and the time where any uncertainty is the situation is resolved. The 
timing element is related to the first mover advantage and will be explored in later sub-
sections. 
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2.5 THE DOMINANT STRATEGY 
Game theory assumes the players to be rational as they make choices which result in the 
outcome they prefer most against what the opponent does. In an extreme case, players 
might have two strategies, so that given any combination of strategies of the opponent 
players they resulting outcome from one is better than the other. In this case the outcome 
of the strategy which is yield better than the other is the dominant strategy. Rational 
ƉůĂǇĞƌƐ ǁŝůů ŶĞǀĞƌ ĐŚŽŽƐĞ ƚŽ ƉůĂǇ ƚŚĞ ĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ? ĂƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƐĞ ŽĨ  ‘ƉƌŝƐŽŶĞƌ ?Ɛ
ĚŝůĞŵŵĂ ? ? 
dŚĞƉƌŝƐŽŶĞƌ ?ƐĚŝůĞŵŵĂŝƐĂƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĨŽƌŵŽĨŐĂŵĞǁŚŝĐŚƚĂŬĞƐƉůĂĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚǁŽƉůĂǇĞƌƐ ?
Each player has two strategies, (1) cooperate, or (2) defect. Example below shows the 
strategic form of a game  W ƉƌŝƐŽŶĞƌ ?ƐĚŝůĞŵŵĂ ?
FIGURE 1: STRATEGIC FORM GAME 
 
Source: Authors adaptations 
 
Players I and II as represented in figure 1 above have two strategies, cooperate or defect, 
which are labelled A and B for player I and a and b for player II. Figure 1 above shows the 
resulting payoffs of this game. The strategy cooperate, has a payoff of 3 (A, a) for each 
player, and the combination of B, b gives the players a payoff of 1. However the 
combinations (A, b) or (a, B) give the player a payoff of 5 or 0 respectively.  
/Ŷ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŝƐŽŶĞƌ ?Ɛ ĚŝůĞŵma game, defect is the strategy that dominates over cooperative.  
Strategy B of player I dominates strategy A and vice-versa for player II. However, no rational 
player will choose the dominated strategy because both players are better off than the 
unique payoff of B, b resultant from defect the defect, and thus cooperate with A, a 
strategic decision. 
dŚĞƉƌŝƐŽŶĞƌ ?ƐĚŝůĞŵŵĂŝƐĂĐůĂƐƐŝĐĐĂƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƚǁŽƉƌŝƐŽŶĞƌƐŚĞůĚƐƵƐƉĞĐƚŽĨĂƐĞƌŝŽƵƐĐƌŝŵĞ ?
There is no evidence for the crime except if one of the prisoner ?Ɛ ƚĞƐƚŝĨŝĞƐ ? /ĨŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵ
does, then he will be rewarded with immunity (A, b or b, A) whereas the other will serve 
II
I
A
B
a b
53
3 0
10
15
Player II
P
la
ye
r 
I
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prison sentence. If both testify then they will be reduced sentence (B, b), however is non-
testify then there is no case (A, a). The defection here is the immunity option from 
testifying, which has a higher payoff thus this constitutes dilemma.  
The dilemma arises in various contexts where the players individual defection at the 
expense of the other lead to overall less desirable outcomes. Example includes litigation 
instead of settlement, cut-price marketing, etc. where the resulting outcome is detrimental 
ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ƉůĂǇĞƌƐ ? dŽ ƚĂĐŬůĞ ƚŚĞ ŽďǀŝŽƵƐ ŝŶĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ ĐĂƵƐĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ ŽĨ ƉƌŝƐŽŶĞƌ ?Ɛ
ĚŝůĞŵŵĂ ŐĂŵĞƐ ? ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚ ƌĞƉĞĂƚĞĚ ŐĂŵĞƐ ? ǁŚĞƌ ƉĂƚƚĞƌŶƐ ŽĨ ĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ĂŶĚ
rational behaviour can be established and the fear of punishment in the future outweighs 
their gain from defecting today.  
 
2.6 EQUILIBRIUM IN GAMES 
Game theory helps figure out what in the likely outcome of a game when all players 
interact. We considered dominating strategies in our previous example, however; there are 
no dominating strategies in many games, and so these considerations are not enough to 
rule out any outcomes or provide specific advice on how to play the game. In such players 
ƌĞĂĐŚĂŶĞƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵƵƐŝŶŐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞďĞƐƚƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐƚŽŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐ. 
This equilibrium concept is called the Nash equilibrium. Nash equilibrium prescribes 
strategies that are mutually the best responses that players cannot improve upon 
unilaterally. The rational is that each player plays his best strategy given the choice of the 
other player. By construction, Nash equilibrium is a stable, self-reinforcing equilibrium and 
no player has the incentive to change their behaviour unilaterally. Example below shows 
Nash equilibrium in the strategic-form game. 
FIGURE 2: STRATEGIC FORM - NASH EQULIBRIUM 
Source: Authors adaptations 
 
Players I and II as represented in Figure 2 above and are deciding wither to expand their 
production at a large scale of a small scale. If Player I choose to make a small expansion, he 
has estimated the following scores, 21 if Player II does not expand, 17 if Player II makes a 
small expansion, and 10 if Player II expands and Player I does not expand. Similarly, Player II 
has the same rationale to expand. Here we notice no dominant strategies, but we do notice 
19, 19 16, 21 10, 19
21, 16 17, 17 9, 13
19, 10 13, 9 0, 0
Do not expand Small expansion Large expansion
Do not expand
Small expansion
Large expansion
Player II
P
la
ye
r 
I
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an equilibrium point (17, 17) before both players choose a large expansion strategy. In the 
above example both players will be better off if they do not expand and so a rational pursuit 
of self-interest is not advisable. 
Nash equilibriums are stable equilibriums, but they are not necessarily efficient. Efficient 
outcomes are outcomes that usually maximize the collective interest of the players, but are 
not necessarily stable. There is no other combination of strategies that could make at least 
one player better off without making any other player worse off (Pareto Optimum) as 
ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇŶŽŶĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚEĂƐŚĞƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵƐĂƌĞĐĂůůĞĚWƌŝƐŽŶĞƌ ?ƐĚŝůĞŵŵĂ ? 
 
2.7 EQUILIBRIUM IN GAMES 
In the previous example identified more than one Nash equilibriums, (19, 19) and (17, 17). 
In theory, strategic interaction shoƵůĚ ŐƵŝĚĞ ƉůĂǇĞƌƐ ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ  “ŵŽƐƚ ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞ ?
equilibriums. Many literatures suggest equilibrium refinement; an attempt to make one 
equilibrium more plausible or convincing than the other. In our previous example, it could 
be argued that an equilibrium that is best for both players in do not expand as shown in 
Figure 2. 
However, this theoretical consideration for equilibrium is a more complicated process than 
described by game theory perspectives. Like in the second equilibrium under figure 2 (17, 
17) although this is an inferior outcome, it still is a better worst-case payoff (0, 0). This is 
therefore referred as a max-min strategy as it maximizes the minimum payoff the players 
can get in each case. In this sense, investing in a small expansion is a safer choice than large 
ĞǆƉĂŶƐŝŽŶĂŶĚĂƐŝƚ ?ƐĂůƐŽĂƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞĞƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵ ?ĂŶĚŝƐĂũƵƐƚŝĨŝĂďůĞƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŝƐƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂ
similar expectation than the other player. 
 
2.8 EVOLUTIONARY GAMES 
Example discussed in Figure 2 can further give a different interpretation where we can 
assume large populations of identical players.  In this case we can view the equilibrium as 
the outcome of dynamic processes rather than conscious rational analysis. 
The evolutionary interpretation is set where there are large populations of individuals, each 
who can adopt either of the strategies. The dynamics of evolutionary games assumes that 
each strategy is played by a fraction of the individuals. Based on this distribution, players 
with better average payoffs will be more successful than others, so in the long-term their 
proportion in the population increases overtime. In the case of symmetric games with only 
two possible strategies the dynamic process will move towards an equilibrium.  
If new players enter the example described in Figure 2 the options are between do not 
expand or small expansion as large leads to (0, 0) payoff. As new players come into the 
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market, a certain fraction might choose not to expand, assuming that a quarter chooses not 
to expand then their payoff depends on this fraction factored against those who make a 
small expansion. Their payoff now would be ͷȀͺ ൈ ͷͿ൅ ͹Ȁͺ ൈ ͷͽ ൌ ͷͽǤͻ which is still 
higher than 17 under the small expansion strategy. Overtime, the proportion of the 
ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐǁŚŽǁŽŶ ?ƚĐŚŽŽƐĞƚŽĞǆƉĂŶĚŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƐĂŶĚĞǀĞŶƚually a new equilibrium will be 
established. 
Evolutionary games are population dynamic views and are useful as it does not require the 
assumption that all the players are complicated strategic planners that they are rational 
which is often unrealistic. The notion of rationality is replaces with the concept of a weaker 
reproductive success (Smith, 1982). 
 
2.9 MIXED STRATEGIES 
A strategic form game does not necessarily have Nash equilibriums where players 
deterministically choose their strategy. Many players may randomly select from these pure 
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐ ŽŶĞ ǁŝƚŚ ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ƉƌŽďĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ? dŚŝƐ ƌĂŶĚŽŵŝǌŝŶŐ ŽĨ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ĐŚŽŝĐĞ ŝƐ ĐĂůůĞĚ ŵŝǆĞĚ
strategies. An example of randomizing strategy is quality inspections, where random 
samples are inspected to ensure that the manufacturing meets quality standards. There 
payoff are different as inspections carried over those who already ensure quality standards 
is costly as opposed to the payoff of not complying, in which case we cannot reach an 
equilibrium. Thus randomizing inspections to create expectations of compliances is a mixed 
strategy which does not yield a fixed equilibrium. 
/ŶƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?ŵŝǆĞĚƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐĂƌĞĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŵĂŬĞƌ ?ƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƌŝƐŬ ?Ɛ
discussed in the quality compliance and inspections example above, risk averse decision 
makers or players who have the capabilities to comply or default will comply to quality 
standards. However, their probabilities will be dependent not on their own payoffs but 
rather their opponents payoffs. Having said that, an increase in penalty would not have 
affects on the decision to comply or default but rather the frequency of the inspection, 
which would have dictate a different payoff. In this dynamic process, the long-term 
averages even in mixed strategies will eventually approximate equilibrium probabilities, 
although not Nash equilibrium. 
 
2.10 EXTENSIVE GAMES ʹ PERFECT INFORMATION 
Strategic form of games lack temporal content as players choose their strategies 
simultaneously, without knowing what the choices of the opponent are. They lack detailed 
information and thus extensive form gaming is required; a model of such is the game tree. 
In this section we will discuss games in perfect information, all players at any given point are 
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aware of the previous choices of all other ƉůĂǇĞƌƐ ĂŶĚ ƉůĂǇĞƌ ?Ɛ ŵŽǀĞƐ ĂƌĞ ƐĞƋƵĞŶƚŝĂů  ?ŶŽ
simultaneous movements). 
FIGURE 3: EXTENSIVE GAME - GAME TREE 
 Source: Authors adaptations 
 
For example, two players are exploring new markets i.e. car manufacturing firms looking to 
invest in the potential super hybrid cars market as shown in Figure 3. Since this is a 
sequential game process we assume that Player II will only get the opportunity to move 
after Player I has made the decision and the information has been made available. Extensive 
games in this form with perfect information can then be analyzed by backward induction. 
This technique involves identifying the last possible choice that players would make; in our 
example Player II moves last as they know the game will end with their move and thus can 
safely choose their strategy.  In both cases Player II will choose not to invest in the market as 
their best payoffs in whatever decision Player I takes are $0 and -$3 billon. 
Once the last moves from are understood, Player I would then use backward induction to 
make the next-to-last move accordingly. In this case based on the outcome that Player II will 
choose not to invest into the market, PlĂǇĞƌ / ?Ɛ ƉĂǇŽĨĨƐ ĂƌĞ  ? ? Žƌ  ? ? ? ? ďŝůůŝŽŶ ? ůĞĂƌůǇ ƚŚĞ
decision here is that Player I does invest, given that he is the first mover and that Player II 
cannot move simultaneously and that Player II does not invest in either scenarios. 
 
 
Player I
Player II
$ 0, $ 0
-$ 1 bill, -$ 1 bill 
Player II
$ 0.3 bill, -$ 3 bill
-$ 4 bill, -$ 4 bill
out
out
out
in
in
in
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2.11 EXTENSIVE GAMES ʹ IMPERFECT INFORMATION 
Typically perfect information does not exist and players do not have access to all the 
information relevant to their choices. In this case, modelling extensive games with imperfect 
information exactly identifies those imperfection information (Harsanyi, 1992). In this case 
probabilities are set to evaluate and identify weak and strong strategies and randomization 
is the best response. 
Since there is no information as to what the last move would be, backward induction cannot 
be used to evaluate the decision on the next-to-last move and therefore decision makers 
would than evaluate probabilities against payoffs which would then be a determinant on 
the nature of the decision maker. 
 
3 GAME THEORY TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES 
There have been many attempts to produce strategic tools for business managers to use 
game theories. However, there has been little success as business problems are more 
complicated in reality. Business games are subject to many factors including decision 
ŵĂŬĞƌ ?Ɛ ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐ ? ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ ĂƐ ƚŽ ǁŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐ ĂƌĞ ? ǁŚŽ ƚŚĞ ƉůĂǇĞƌƐ ĂƌĞ ĂŶĚ
weather they are able to join the game or not. None the less there are ways of capturing 
these elements using the value net tool developed by Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1995.  
FIGURE 4: THE VALUE NET 
 
Source: Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1995 
 
Company
Customer
ComplementorCompetitor
Supplier
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The value net framework as shown in Figure 4 is a good way to identify players in a game. 
The vertical axis represents the transactors and the horizontal axis identifies the interactors. 
By using the framework we can provide some structure to the game and identify the players 
and their relationships. 
 
4 GAME THEORY AND SCENARIO BACKGROUND 
Game theory can be used to gain an understanding of how players pursuing their own self-
interest might respond to scenarios. As discussed in the project titled  “Scenario Planning as 
a Tool for Long Term Strategic Planning - dŚĞ'ĞŶĞƌŝĐƐƌƵŐ/ŶĚƵƐƚƌǇŝŶƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶhŶŝŽŶ ?
the authors created three unique scenarios. These three scenarios yielded different macro 
environments and strategies for EU generic drugs industry. The industry implications and 
the strategic recommendations have been extensively discussed in the report mentioned 
above. However a brief description of the scenarios and their implications are summarized 
below: 
Scenario 1: Todo es bueno! This scenario describes an optimistic environment of the EU. The 
hŶŽǁŚĂƐ ? ?ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ?ƐƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚƐŚŽǁƐĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞĞǆƉĂŶƐŝŽŶ ?dŚĞhĞĐŽŶŽŵǇŝƐ
growing and there is cooperation and harmonization amongst the member states. Euro is 
not the national currency which and there is business environment stability. Furthermore, 
political leadership has enforced stringent regulatory measures, and the EU is now open to 
international free markets promoting competition at a global scale. There is an ageing 
population as lifestyles have improved dramatically, however because of the high affluent 
societies and technological advancements there is less pressure on healthcare and 
insurances markets of healthcare now hold large market shares.  
FIGURE 5: PORTER'S 5 FORCES EVALUATING SCENARIO 1 
 
Source: Authors interpretations 
RIVALRY
- High
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 ?Low
BARRIERS TO
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SUBSTITUTES
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 ?Medium
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Scenario 2: Nein, Nicht Gut! This scenario describes a pessimistic environment of the EU. 
The Euro zone has disintegrated and member states have reverted back to their old 
currencies. There is disparity amongst the EU member states and a protectionist stance has 
further fragmented policies, regulations and political stability. International competition 
poses a constant threat to national industries and low GDP, business confidence and volatile 
business cycles has impacted business confidence as organizations struggle to survive. 
Furthermore high unemployment, ageing populations and depression has pressured 
healthcare public spending. 
FIGURE 6: PORTER'S 5 FORCES EVALUATING SCENARIO 2 
 
Source: Authors interpretations 
 
Scenario 3: Deux Union Européene! This scenario represents two distinct EUs. The strong 
Euro zone that now comprises of only strong member states i.e. Germany, Italy, France, UK, 
etc. where there are strong economies and business stability and the periphery non-Euro 
zone where the economy is weaker and business instability. Euro zone now has a strong 
EURO that was factored from cooperation, harmonization and political stability from the 
member states. There have been dramatic technological improvements and business 
confidence is high due to a stable economic environment. The Euro zone members are now 
international free markets where market information, consumer protection and stringent 
regulatory frameworks ensure a quality lifestyle. Ageing population pressure is weak 
because of improved healthcare systems.  However, the non-Euro zone member states have 
an opposite economic environment. These member states have united under a protectionist 
stance against international competition; they suffer from low GDP, and often have political 
instability. Due to the macro environmental instability, business cycles are volatile and thus 
leading to high unemployment and low morality with an ageing population and poor 
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healthcare systems. Strong unions have formed that are further detrimental to the overall 
growth of the member states.  
FIGURE 7: PORTER'S 5 FORCES EVALUATING SCENARIO 3 
 
Source: Authors interpretations 
 
4.1 EU GENERIC DRUGS MARKET ʹ VALUE NET 
In order to formulate a game the first step is to identify the strategies, the players and their 
willingness to join the game. This can be done by evaluating the value net for a sample 
organization. For exemplary purposes, Pfizer has been used to test the strategies 
recommended as part of the project titled  “Scenario Planning as a Tool for Long Term 
Strategic Planning - dŚĞ'ĞŶĞƌŝĐƐƌƵŐ/ŶĚƵƐƚƌǇŝŶƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶhŶŝŽŶ ? ?
The value net framework as shown in Figure 5 is populated using the information provided 
under Appendix 1  W Stakeholders in the European Pharmaceutical market, and Appendix 2  W 
Pharmaceutical process flow mind map.  
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FIGURE 8: THE VALUE NET - GENERIC DRUGS INDUSTRY 
 
Source: Authors interpretations 
The value net framework (Figure 8) lists the players in each of the categories for Pfizer 
pharmaceuticals in the EU. For demonstration purposes the achievable payoffs are 
estimated to range between -5 to 10 respectively.  
 
5 GAME FORMULATION 
The project titled  “Scenario Planning as a Tool for Long Term Strategic Planning - The 
'ĞŶĞƌŝĐƐƌƵŐ/ŶĚƵƐƚƌǇŝŶƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶhŶŝŽŶ ? has listed seven strategies. Each strategy is 
unique and aims to maximize market share and competitive competency of the EU generic 
drugs players. Seven games have been formulated to evaluate the seven strategies against 
respective players and stakeholders identified by the value net framework as show in Figure 
8. 
Strategy 1: Revisit your generic strategies. The report identifies that players of the generic 
drugs industry in the EU are using cost containment strategies to compete on pricing for 
winning institutional purchases. The most dominant generic strategy is to achieve cost 
leadership and focus efforts on upstream activities as the industry suffers from high buyer 
power that are  cost incentive. Although this is a justifiable strategy, the report argues that 
Company
Pfizer
Customer
ComplementorCompetitor
Supplier
Pharmaceuticals
1. GlaxoSmithKline
2. Sanofi-Aventis
3. AstraZeneca
4. Novartis
5. Roche
6. Wyeth
7. Merck & Co
8. Lilly
9. Boehringer Ingelheim
Customers
1. Institutional purchases
i. Government
ii. Insurance
2. Consumers
3. Pharmacies
4. Hospitals
5. Retailers
Complementors
1. Doctors
2. Pharmacists
3. Wholesalers
4. Complementary drugs
Suppliers
1. Chemical manufacturers
2. Logistics & Distribution
3. Manufacturing
4. Aggregate producers
Competitors
1. Pharmaceutical branded
2. Generic unbranded
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this is not a sustainable strategy in the long-run and advocates cost and differentiation 
leadership strategies should run parallel. The rationale justified to use parallel strategies is 
based on the hypothesis that costs focused strategies lack innovation, are susceptible to 
price wars, and often overlook quality. To balance these trade-offs differentiation strategies 
and activities will strengthen dynamic inefficiencies, endorse brand equity and 
customer/stakeholder value proposition and/or innovation would promote new product 
development and further create new markets. 
To evaluate this strategy Figure 9 shows an extensive form game where the player evaluates 
polar strategies; cost leadership or differentiation leadership and the third parallel strategy 
combination against the competitors in the plausible scenarios described in previous 
sections. 
FIGURE 9: GENERIC STRATEGY GAME 
Source: Authors interpretations 
The game tree as shown in Figure 9 is a sequential game and hypothesizes that 
GlaxoSmithKline will not use combination strategies but polar strategies, and there is 
perfect information. These assumptions have been purposely made due to the complex 
relationship between the scenarios, the players, and various external factors. Based on this 
assumption using backward induction technique is used to evaluate the Subgame Perfect 
Equilibrium. Each player is assumed to move optimally at each node and is expected to act 
in their best interest. The payoffs calculated for GlaxoSmithKline are represented in Table 1 
below: 
 
 
Pfizer
Cost Leadership
GlaxoSmithKline
Cost
Scenario 1 (+2,0)
Scenario 2 (+4,+3)
Scenario 3 (+3,+1)
Differentiation
Scenario 1 (+1,+7)
Scenario 2 (+8,0)
Scenario 3 (+4,+3)
Combination
GlaxoSmithKline
Cost
Scenario 1 (+9,0)
Scenario 2 (+3,+5)
Scenario 3 (+7,+3)
Differentiation
Scenario 1 (+4,+3)
Scenario 2 (+3,0)
Scenario 3 (+7,+2)
Differentiation 
Leadership
GlaxoSmithKline
Cost
Scenario 1 (+7,+1)
Scenario 2 (0,+8)
Scenario 3 (+3,+4)
Differentiation
Scenario 1 (+4,+3)
Scenario 2 (+2,0)
Scenario 3 (+3,+1)
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TABLE 1: STRATEGY 1 PAYOFF'S GLAXOSMITHKLINE 
Pfizer GlaxoSmithKline  
Strategy Cost Differentiation 
Cost Leadership 4 10 
Combination 8 5 
Differentiation Leadership 13 4 
Total 25 19 
Source: Authors interpretations 
Based on the results calculated in Table 1, the best strategy for GlaxoSmithKline is Cost 
containment strategies which has an overall payoff of 25. Using backward induction, we 
then eliminate differentiation strategy as the option dominant by GlaxoSmithKline and 
identify the best strategy Pfizer should choose. Thus payoffs calculated for Pfizer are 
represented in Table 2 below: 
TABLE 2: STRATEGY 1 PAYOFF'S PFIZER 
Strategy Payoff 
Cost Leadership 9 
Combination 19 
Differentiation Leadership 10 
Source: Authors interpretations 
Based on the results calculated in Table 2, the best strategy for Pfizer is the combination 
strategy which has the highest payoff of 19. This strategy not only secures the largest payoff 
but also hedges against the scenarios. 
Strategy 2: The key ingredient. This strategy is based over the growing threat of counterfeit 
drugs identified explicitly in the scenarios. The strategies and recommendations identified 
to EU generic drug manufacturers are to improve quality standards and strengthen 
marketing activities to improve their brand equity and value proposition. Additionally 
various value added recommendations are also identified. However, the key element here is 
quality and Figure 10 represents the quality choices using the extensive form game. 
FIGURE 10: QUALITY CHOICE GAME 
 
Source: Authors interpretations 
In this game we have identified Customers i.e. government purchasers, insurances, etc. 
preferences to quality in light of the growing counterfeit concerns and generic drugs 
Pfizer
Customers
(5, 5 )
(0, 1)
Customer
(6, 0)
(2, 1)
High Quality
Low Quality
buy
ŽŶ ?ƚďƵǇ
buy
ŽŶ ?ƚďƵǇ
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producers payoffs respectively.  Similarly to the previous game, using backward induction, 
the decision between high quality and low quality is effectively between the outcome 
payoffs (5, 5) of (2, 1) as these are the customers last most preferred moves. Clearly, Pfizer 
in this case would choose high quality as it presents a higher payoff thus justifying the 
strategic recommendation. 
Strategy 3: ŽŶ ?ƚďĞƉĞŶŶǇǁŝƐĞ ǁŝƚŚ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ?dŚŝƐ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƉůĂǇĞƌƐ ƚŽ ŝŶǀĞƐƚ ŝŶ
research and development to identify possible risks and/or create new markets i.e. new 
product development. Figure 11 show the extensive form game of players investing in 
research and development against those who are not investing and their payoffs. 
FIGURE 11: R&D INVESTMENTS GAME 
 
Source: Authors interpretations 
This extensive form game is deterministic to technological development i.e. biotechnological 
breakthroughs, etc. and thus the payoffs calculated are subjective to these technological 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƐ ? hƐŝŶŐ ďĂĐŬǁĂƌĚ ŝŶĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ 'ůĂǆŽ^ŵŝƚŚ<ůŝŶĞ ?Ɛ ĚĞƐŝƌĂďůĞ ƉĂǇŽĨĨƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
scenario where there are new technological breakthroughs the desired payoffs are (+3, +2) 
and (-2, +2) which reinforces the investing in R&D decision. However in the event of no new 
technological breakthroughs the desired payoffs are (-2, 0) and (0, 0) and this argues against 
investing in R&D. In this case we thus compare the aggregate payoffs which yields positive 
the payoff off +1 for investing in wither scenarios and -1 for not investing in either scenarios. 
dŚƵƐWĨŝǌĞƌ ?ƐŶĞǆƚ-to-last move is investing in R&D irrespective of the scenarios. Additionally 
ƚŚŝƐŵŽǀĞŝƐĂƐĞƋƵĞŶƚŝĂůŵŽǀĞĂŶĚƚŚƵƐƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂĨŝƌƐƚŵŽǀĞƌ ?ƐĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞŽĨA? ?ĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚ
ƚŽ'ůĂǆŽ^ŵŝƚŚ<ůŝŶĞ ?ƐƉĂǇŽĨĨŽĨA? ? 
Technology
Pfizer
GlaxoSmithKline
(+3,+2)
(+3,-1)
GlaxoSmithKline
(-2,+2)
(-2,-2)
Pfizer
GlaxoSmithKline
(-2,-1)
(-2,0)
GlaxoSmithKline
(0,-1)
(0,0)
New technological 
developments
No technological 
developments
Invest in R&D
ŽŶ ?ƚ/ŶǀĞƐƚŝŶZ ?
Invest in R&D
ŽŶ ?ƚ/ŶǀĞƐƚŝŶZ ?
Invest in R&D
ŽŶ ?ƚ/ŶǀĞƐƚŝŶZ ?
Invest in R&D
ŽŶ ?ƚ/ŶǀĞƐƚŝŶZ ?
Invest in R&D
ŽŶ ?ƚ/ŶǀĞƐƚŝŶZ ?
Invest in R&D
ŽŶ ?ƚ/ŶǀĞƐƚŝŶZ ?
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Strategy 4: Stakeholder Management. This strategy recommends EU generic drugs players 
to invest in stakeholder management. The rationale behind this recommendation is the 
growing influence of stakeholders over the generic drugs industry in the scenarios 
identified. Here the extensive form game is intended to identify the long-term (20 years) 
payoffs of players investing early in stakeholder management. Figure 12 represents the 
extensive form game of players investing in stakeholder management. 
FIGURE 12: STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT GAME 
 Source: Authors interpretations 
Using backward induction the best payoffs for GlaxoSmithKline are (+9, +5) and (-4, +5) that 
dictated the dominant strategy is to invest in stakeholder management. Thus the best next-
to-last strategy for Pfizer is to invest in stakeholder management also, however since this is 
a sequential game there is a first movers distinctive advantage where Pfizer has a higher 
ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞƉĂǇŽĨĨŽĨA? ?ĂƐĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚƚŽ'ůĂǆŽ^ŵŝƚŚ<ůŝŶĞ ?ƐA? ? ? 
Strategy 5: Invest in Green. This strategy recommends the EU generic drugs industry players 
to invest in green practices. The rationale behind this recommendation is based on the 
global concerns over sustainable practices and the predicted carbon monitoring regulations. 
Figure 13 represents an extensive form game of players investing in green practices and 
their respective payoffs. 
Pfizer
GlaxoSmithKline
(+9, +5 )
(+9, -4)
GlaxoSmithKline
(-4, +5)
(-4, -4)
Invest in stakeholder management
ŽŶ ?ƚŝŶǀĞƐƚin stakeholder 
management
Invest in stakeholder management
Invest in stakeholder management
ŽŶ ?ƚŝŶǀĞƐƚin stakeholder 
management
ŽŶ ?ƚŝŶǀĞƐƚin stakeholder 
management
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FIGURE 13: GREEN PRACTICES GAME 
 
Source: Authors interpretations 
Using backward induction the best payoffs for GlaxoSmithKline are (+7, +3) and (-6, +7) that 
dictated the dominant strategy is to invest in green practices. Thus the best next-to-last 
strategy for Pfizer is to invest in green practices also, however since this is a sequential 
game there is a first movers distinctive advantage where Pfizer has a higher positive payoff 
of +7 as compared to 'ůĂǆŽ^ŵŝƚŚ<ůŝŶĞ ?ƐA? ? ? 
Strategy 6: Strategic Location: This strategy suggests EU generic drugs players to investigate 
the possibility of sourcing manufacturing from EU countries. The rationale behind this 
recommendation is the distinctive proximity advantages players can gain by manufacturing 
in these member states. Figure 14 represents the extensive form game for players investing 
in sourcing in EU member states.  
Pfizer
GlaxoSmithKline
(+7, +3 )
(+7, -6)
GlaxoSmithKline
(-6, +7)
(-6, -6)
Invest in green practices
ŽŶ ?ƚŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŶŐƌĞĞŶƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ
Invest in green practices
Invest in green practices
ŽŶ ?ƚŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŶŐƌĞĞŶƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ
ŽŶ ?ƚŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŶŐƌĞĞŶƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ
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FIGURE 14: STRATEGIC LOCATION GAME 
 
Source: Authors interpretations 
This extensive form game is deterministic to the member states infrastructure i.e. logistics, 
etc. and thus the payoffs calculated are subjective to these technological developments. 
hƐŝŶŐďĂĐŬǁĂƌĚ ŝŶĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ'ůĂǆŽ^ŵŝƚŚ<ůŝŶĞ ?ƐĚĞƐŝƌĂďůĞƉĂǇŽĨĨƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞƐĐĞŶĂrio where there 
are new technological breakthroughs the desired payoffs are (+4, +2) and (-4, +2) which 
reinforces the investing in member states decision. However in the event of no new 
technological breakthroughs the desired payoffs are (-2, 0) and (0, 0) and this argues against 
investing in member states. In this case we thus compare the aggregate payoffs which yields 
positive the payoff off +1 for investing in wither scenarios and -1 for not investing in either 
ƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽƐ ? dŚƵƐ WĨŝǌĞƌ ?Ɛ ŶĞǆƚ-to-last move is investing in member state irrespective of the 
ƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽƐ ? ĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ ƚŚŝƐ ŵŽǀĞ ŝƐ Ă ƐĞƋƵĞŶƚŝĂů ŵŽǀĞ ĂŶĚ ƚŚƵƐ ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ Ă ĨŝƌƐƚ ŵŽǀĞƌ ?Ɛ
ĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞŽĨA? ?ĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽ'ůĂǆŽ^ŵŝƚŚ<ůŝŶĞ ?ƐƉĂǇŽĨĨŽĨA? ?
Strategy 7: Face the enemy. This strategy recommends players to form strategic alliances 
either by mergers & acquisitions of joint ventures with strong foreign competitors to reduce 
the industry rivalry and promote organizational learning in achieving economies of scale and 
dynamic efficiencies.  Figure 15 represents the extensive form game for players forming 
strategic alliances with foreign competitors. 
Member State 
i.e. Turkey
Pfizer
GlaxoSmithKline
(+4,+2)
(+4,-4)
GlaxoSmithKline
(-4,+2)
(-4,-4)
Pfizer
GlaxoSmithKline
(-2,-1)
(-2,0)
GlaxoSmithKline
(0,-1)
(0,0)
Developed 
Infrastructure
Poor Infrastructure
Invest in manufacturing
ŽŶ ?ƚ/ŶǀĞƐƚŝŶ
manufacturing
Invest in manufacturing
ŽŶ ?ƚ/ŶǀĞƐƚŝŶ
manufacturing
Invest in manufacturing
ŽŶ ?ƚ/ŶǀĞƐƚŝŶ
manufacturing
Invest in manufacturing
ŽŶ ?ƚ/ŶǀĞƐƚŝŶ
manufacturing
Invest in manufacturing
ŽŶ ?ƚ/ŶǀĞƐƚŝŶ
manufacturing
Invest in manufacturing
ŽŶ ?ƚ/ŶǀĞƐƚŝŶ
manufacturing
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FIGURE 15: SRATEGIC ALLIANCE GAME 
 
Source: Authors interpretations 
Using backward induction the best payoffs for GlaxoSmithKline are (+9, +5) and (-4, +5) that 
dictated the dominant strategy is to form strategic alliances. Thus the best next-to-last 
strategy for Pfizer is to form strategic alliances also, however since this is a sequential game 
there is a first movers distinctive advantage where Pfizer has a higher positive payoff of +9 
ĂƐĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚƚŽ'ůĂǆŽ^ŵŝƚŚ<ůŝŶĞ ?ƐA? ? ? 
 
6 CONCLUSION 
Game theory is a unified disciplined language for a range of strategic decision making 
problems.  The unified language allows strategic decision makers with a range of modelling 
options when faced with facts of a particular industry, i.e. repeated games, mixed games, 
informed and non informed games, etc. By using the tools and techniques of game theory 
perspectives the report has evaluated the strategic recommendation advocated by the 
report titled,  “Scenario Planning as a Tool for Long Term Strategic Planning - The Generics 
ƌƵŐ /ŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ hŶŝŽŶ ? and further reinforced the strategies and 
recommendation. The evaluation yielded higher payoffs for first movers and therefore 
recommends EU generic drugs players to test their internal strategies against the scenarios 
and further evaluate the strategic recommendation using other economic perspectives i.e. 
transaction costs perspectives, agency cost perspectives and resource based view. 
 
 
Pfizer
GlaxoSmithKline
(+9, +5 )
(+9, -4)
GlaxoSmithKline
(-4, +5)
(-4, -4)
Forms Strategic Alliance
Does not form Strategic Alliance
Forms Strategic Alliance
Forms Strategic Alliance
Does not form Strategic Alliance
Does not form Strategic Alliance
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APPENDIX 1  
There are several direct/indirect stakeholders involved in the pharmaceutical industry and 
Figure 1 (below) is a diagrammatic representation of the stakeholders and their interactions. 
It is important to understand these interactions in order to populate the value net 
framework. 
FIGURE 1: STAKEHOLDERS IN THE EUROPEAN PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET 
 
Source: Ginneken & Busse (2010). 
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APPENDIX 2  
Figure 1 below shows the pharmaceutical industry stakeholder mind map that represents 
the relationships between the various stakeholders and their interactions.  
FIGURE 1: PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY STAKEHOLDER AND INTERACTIONS MIND MAP. 
 
Source: Allee (2010). 
